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Abstract. 
 
We make two contributions to the debate on aid-effectiveness, illustrating that for 
impact on poverty what matters is not just the level but also the composition and 
stability of aid. One specific implication of this for aid policy is that aid most 
effectively reduces poverty if it supports public (and other) expenditures which are 
supportive of agricultural development – these, our regression analysis confirms, are 
not only direct expenditure on agriculture, but also education and infrastructure, and 
military expenditure has a negative impact. Three factors appear to be particularly 
conducive to the development of stable pro-poor expenditure patterms (and in 
particular pro-agriculture expenditure patterns). These are expenditure strategies 
which protect the poor against risk, the development of stable relations between 
governments and aid donors, and long-term political commitment to pro-poor 
strategies by government. The argument is pursued partly by panel-data econometric 
analysis of developing countries as a whole, and partly by case studies of sustained 
and non-sustained green revolutions in heavily aid-dependent countries in Africa. 
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1 Introduct
               Albeit that the aid-effectiveness debate has become 
progressively more technical and more intense, it has not yet reached an 
equilibrium. The proposition that aid effectiveness is positive, but policy-
contingent (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Mosley, 
Hudson and Verschoor, 2004), currently sits alongside the proposition that it is 
effective whatever the policy regime (Tarp and Hansen, 2001) and the 
proposition that, under proper estimation methods, effectiveness cannot be 
established (Gonzalez et al. 2004) or may even be negative for long-term 
institutional development (Braeutigam et al. 2004). Arguments for and against 
conditionality consequently continue to abound, and within the ‘for’ camp there 
are sub-debates about the right instrument(s) to use. Aid donors, NGOs and 
policy makers, all of them wondering what is the right way if any to use 
overseas aid as an instrument of development, have the right to feel 
confused. 
. ion 
                    The argument of this paper is that while most aid is indeed, on 
balance, effective, its effectiveness is conditioned by factors other than the 
components of ‘good policy’ emphasised by Dollar and Burnside. Specifically, 
we argue, two dimensions of aid flows, other than size and policy 
environment, matter for aid effectiveness: stability and inter-sectoral 
distribution. On the first point, whether or not an aid flow is sustained and 
perceived as sustainable has, on standard permanent-income arguments, an 
important bearing on whether it has a long-term ability to influence 
expenditure patterns. On the second point, various dimensions of inter-
sectoral distribution are relevant, but in this paper we focus on the role of 
agriculture, because, we argue, the agricultural sector of a developing country 
has a unique ability to generate poverty reduction, partly because small 
farmers, at least, often have low incomes, but also because of the sector’s 
labour-intensity,  its ability to reduce the prices of goods consumed by the 
poor, and its ability to stimulate linkages to the non-farm sector. Both these 
characteristics of the aid flow, stability and inter-sectoral distribution, are 
heavily influenced by the country’s political structure. 
                     We support this argument by means of two different 
methodologies. In Section 2, we use a regression approach, arguing that 
institutional quality as well as the two variables mentioned above has an 
important bearing on aid effectiveness. By contrast, in section 3, we offer four 
case studies, all from Africa where aid dependence is generally highest, 
examining two ‘ positive outliers’, Ethiopia and Uganda, where aid 
effectiveness has been impressively high, and two, Zimbabwe and Malawi, 
where it has been depressingly low. Section 4 presents the conclusions for 
policy. 
 
2.General approach and regression tests 
 
               It is now conventional to distinguish the effect of aid (A) on poverty 
(P) as operating partly in a direct manner through growth (Y) and partly 
through its effects on policy and institutions, which for the moment we 
summarise in a vector α: 
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dP =        ∂P     [∂Y   +   ∂Y ∂α  ]    +  ∂P  ∂α                     (1) 
           dA           ∂Y     [∂A        ∂α ∂A  ]        ∂α  ∂A 
       
 The dominant controversy in the aid-effectiveness literature at present is 
whether the ‘policy and institutions’ vector  α matters, and if so what should go 
into it . Dollar and Burnside (2000) have put forward the ‘Washington 
consensus’ view that the α-vector should consist of  mainly macro-variables 
(budget deficit and inflation) plus economic openness; Collier and Dollar 
(2002) add to this shortlist the large range of  variables (related to 
governance, etc.) contained in the World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index. 
 Our own approach is different. Firstly, we argue that neither the gross 
amount of aid allocations (A) nor the policy vector α is the only parameter 
which matters from the point of view of bringing about sustainable shifts of 
resource allocation from less to more productive uses, and thence to growth 
and poverty reduction, but also the stability of aid flows. This can be seen 
partly in commonsense terms: aid flows which are initiated one year and then 
broken off the next, whatever their average monetary value, have a tangible 
negative consequence in terms of half-completed roads which go nowhere, 
school buildings without teachers, agricultural extension services with no 
credit or seed supplies to support them, and ideas which have no time or 
opportunity to take root, the productivity costs of which are obvious1. 
Secondly, however, instability of aid disbursements has a cost in terms of the 
credibility of subsequent commitments, and thus the allocation of resources. 
Commitments of aid from a donor which has a track record of breaking off aid 
flows (either because of taking a hard line on conditionality, or for any other 
reason) will not generate trust: rather, they will by a rational aid recipient not 
be treated as ‘permanent income’ and for that very reason unlikely to be 
convertible into a long-term increase in expected physical or human capital 
investment, and hence be switched into non-productive expenditure which 
strengthens the political support base. Thirdly, instability of the disbursements 
of one donor damages social capital of a different sort, between members of 
                                                 
1 Some of the processes by which aid by the Rockefeller Foundation and others to the agricultural 
sector of India scored over aid to Africa between the 1960s and the 1980s through being more stable 
are eloquently illustrated by Lele and Goldsmith: 
‘We have noted the foundation’s determination to make a long-term commitment to its  India 
Agriculture Program. This is unlike the very unstable aid commitments to Africa associated with the 
changing political importance of individual recipient countries to aid givers. The USAID’s staff in 
Kenya and Tanzania, for instance, fell sharply (by 53% and 22% respectively) during the presidencies 
of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, only to rise again (by 65% and 43%) under President Jimmy 
Carter… Rockefeller advisers were permitted to work on India programmes for extended terms of 
duty… which helped with the task of creating a constituency of supporters within the cadres of the 
Indian government concerned with agricultural research. [In addition, these long –term tours of duty 
had the result that] advice tended to be more consistent over time and among individuals than is 
generally the case in Africa, where different donors offer mutually contradictory recommendations and 
procedures. 
Another factor that makes it more difficult for contemporary African countries to benefit from 
agricultural research to the degree that India did a quarter-century ago is that they are experiencing a 
much greater turnover of research staff. For example, 51% of researchers in Kenya had been on the job 
less than two years. Only 9% had more than 10 years’ experience… In the case of expatriate personnel, 
official bilateral donor agencies in Africa do not encourage their technical assistance staff to take up 
long-term residence in individual countries.’(Lele and Goldsmith 1989: 317, 331-332.) 
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the donor community, since the failure of one donor, either official or NGO, to 
provide its promised contribution to a joint effort  destroys possibilities for 
coordination in support of ‘productive’ public expenditure programmes. Fourth 
and last, failure to sustain aid flows weakens the political base of support for 
such expenditure, and thereby threatens the stability of public expenditure 
which, as we shall argue below, is also negative for growth and poverty 
reduction possibilities.   For these reasons, we argue that stability of aid 
matters, and indeed that aid flows which are small but stable may be worth 
more than aid flows which have a large average value but which are often 
broken off2.  
                Secondly, we argue that an important determinant of poverty impact 
missing from (1) is the sectoral incidence of aid expenditure, on the grounds 
that growth processes in different parts of the economy have radically different 
capacities for reducing poverty (‘poverty elasticities’). For example, very poor 
people in every country typically depend on unskilled casual labour for their 
subsistence, and hence the promotion of sectors which have a high 
propensity to take on such labour is always an important element in any anti-
poverty strategy, as argued eloquently by the World Bank’s first World 
Development Report on poverty (World Bank 1990). More broadly, sectors 
which are labour-intensive, which contain a high proportion of self-employed 
low-income persons, which supply goods which are salient in the consumption  
of the poor, and whose input demands have the ability to stimulate sectors 
which are pro-poor in the above sense, will themselves be pro-poor, and aid 
will be pro-poor if it falls on these sectors. By the same token, if aid falls on 
sectors which are capital-intensive and which produce goods which are 
insignificant in poor people’s consumption, its ability to reduce poverty is 
small. 
               Historically, one sector above all others has had the ability to 
stimulate pro-poor growth processes, especially in East and parts of South 
Asia (China, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Bangladesh, northwest India), 
and this is smallholder agriculture. Although the early literature on the Asian 
green revolution was sceptical (Freebairn 1995), because the first uptake of 
hybrid wheat and rice was by larger, less risk-averse farmers, it is now 
overwhelmingly acknowledged that its impact on poverty has been positive, 
and indeed that it accounts for a large share of the extraordinary reduction in 
poverty that has characterised these countries over the last thirty years. This 
is above all for four reasons: first its labour-intensity, in other words it is 
intensive in the only factor which most poor people are able to sell; secondly 
its ability to promote linkages to the rural non-farm sector, which is also 
labour-intensive and therefore by the same logic poverty-reducing;  thirdly its 
ability to reduce the cost of goods which poor people consume, ie basic foods; 
and fourthly its direct impact on self-employed producers, the fact that some 
small farmers are themselves below the poverty line. In recent years a 
substantial set of contributions from the ‘Imperial school’ (Dorward et al. 2002, 
2004; Irz et al. 2001; Thirtle et al.2001) has examined and conditionally 
supported the proposition that agriculture may in general terms may be 
treated as an instrument of pro-poor growth, and specifically that it may be 
                                                 
2 There is an analogy between this story and the suggestion by Rodrik (1990) that a consistent stance of 
policy yields more, in terms of macro-economic performance, than depth of reform (expand?) 
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capable, in the very different environment of twenty-first century Africa, of 
bringing about the kind of pro-poor transformation that occurred in Asia 
between the 1960s and the 1990s. Such a process, should it occur, will 
inescapably involve aid donors for better or worse, since they still finance a 
very significant component of the infrastructure, agricultural extension 
services, schools and health services on the African continent – in other 
words, most of the development expenditure and a large part of the recurrent 
expenditure. 
 The intention in this paper, therefore, is to factor these two fundamental 
hypotheses – that the stability of aid flows is crucial, and that their sectoral 
incidence is important too – into the analysis of aid-effectiveness3. Formally, 
this requires us to modify the basic ‘aid-effectiveness identity’  (1) to 
incorporate these factors: 
 
dP =     ∂P     [∂Y   +   ∂Y ∂α  ]  +    ∂P  ∂α    +   ∂P  ∂φ  +  ∂P  ∂σ    (2) 
           dA        ∂Y     [∂A        ∂α ∂A  ]        ∂α  ∂A         ∂φ  ∂A      ∂σ  ∂A       
 
The first two terms incorporate effects of aid through growth and through 
policy, as before; the third term embodies effects operating through the 
sectoral mix φ (the share of pro-poor sectors in GNP) and the final term takes 
in the effects of instability in aid levels, captured by the coefficient of variation 
of aid flows σ. 
 
For estimating purposes, we also need to observe each of the links in the 
chain-of-causation black box by which aid influences poverty: from aid, to 
expenditure, to yields, to indicators of poverty. These linkages are set  out in 
figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Overall model structure 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public expenditure 
patterns Poverty 
levels 
Agricultural 
yields
Conditionality 
processes 
Institutional quality and 
policy stance 
Aid volume and 
‘characteristics’ 
 
 
                                                 
3 We here assume for simplicity that the impact of instability, σ, and the distribution of expenditure, 
φ, fall purely on the numbers of people in poverty and not directly on income, Y.  
 6
 
 Taking note of these linkages requires us to convert (2) into a system 
of estimating equations in which each of the four variables in Figure 1 appears 
as a dependent variable.  
 
(3a) Aid:   A = constant + β1P + miscellaneous instrumental variables 
 
Aid (A) is endogenous, being driven inter al. by the level of poverty (P).  
(3b)The public expenditure mix: 
 
φ1 = constant + β2 σ (A)+ β3 A + β4α + country/time fixed effects 
 
The share of public expenditure allocated to pro-poor sectors φ depends on 
aid instability (σ) , the level of aid (A) and the stance of policy α. The extent to 
which aid is able to induce a shift in the public expenditure pattern (β3 ) will 
depend on the effectiveness of donors’ conditionality. 
 
(3c) Agricultural yields: 
 
Ya  = constant + β5 φ2 + β6 σ (φ2) + β7[ La ]   
La                                                         [ Na] 
 
For reasons indicated earlier, we pick on agriculture as a sector, expenditure 
on which is particularly likely to be pro-poor. Within this sector, yields per unit 
of labour (Ya/La) are determined by the share of expenditure allocated to 
agriculture-supportive sectors (φ2), the variance of this expenditure share σ 
(φ2), population pressure in agriculture (La/Na), and once again by the overall 
stance of policy (α). 
 
(3d) Poverty levels: 
 
P = constant + β8(Ya/La) 
 
Poverty varies (negatively, we expect) with the level of smallholder agricultural 
productivity. 
 
 There are a number of simultaneities in this system, observable in Figure 1 and much 
noted by previous writers on aid (for example influences of poverty on aid allocation 
and of aid on institutional quality): hence in Table 1 below we estimate the system of 
equations (3)  by three-stage least squares methods. The sample for our estimations, 
which are set out in Table 1, is a set of annual observations for 39 developing and 
transitional economies between 1980 and 2002. 
 
Table 1. Aid-expenditure-yields-poverty links: regression analysis 
Simultaneous 3SLS panel-data estimation over period 1980-2002. 
 Dependent variable 
 
 
Aid 
(% of 
GNP) 
 
‘Pro-agricultural’ 
share of 
expenditure(1) 
Growth 
of 
foodcrop 
yields 
Poverty 
indices 
(2) 
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  Agr E+I Mil  PovHC InfMor 
Regression 
coefficients on 
independent variables: 
Equation 1 2 3 4 
Constant 44.35** 
(4.72) 
14.63* 
(2.07) 
4.23 
0.69) 
34.3** 
(4.16) 
21.15** 
(3.92) 
-62.2 
(1.82) 
-91.3 
(1.56) 
Macro variables        
Growth of GDP per cap 
(one period lag) 
  0.0013 
(0.59) 
0.0025 
(0.82) 
-0.002 
(1.19)0 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
0.0009 
(0.05) 
Ln(Instability of 
government expenditure) 
 -0.21** 
(4.40) 
-0.13** 
(3.25) 
-0.105 
(1.86) 
0.036 
(0.90) 
0.49 
(2.11) 
1.11 
(0.40) 
Ln (government 
expenditure, lagged one 
period) 
 -0.027 
(0.53) 
-0.17** 
(3.81) 
-0.097 
(1.59) 
-0.039 
(0.92) 
-0.35 
(1.43) 
-0.28 
(0.68) 
Growth of government 
expenditure(lagged one 
period) 
 -0.0038 
(1.46) 
0.0009 
(0.61) 
-0.002 
(1.32) 
0.0011 
(0.95) 
0.002 
(0.34) 
0.01 
(0.87) 
Ln (economic instability 
variable) 
0.0006 
(1.17) 
0.0001 
(0.30) 
-0.0003 
(0.74) 
0.00004 
(0.09) 
0.0001 
(0.35) 
-0.0008 
(0.45) 
0.002 
(0.83) 
Expenditure shares 
Share of agricultural 
in total expenditures 
(ln (‘agricultural share’)) 
    0.055 
(1.62) 
-0.022 
(0.11) 
-0.71 
(2.08) 
Ln (Growth of agricultural 
share) 
    0.0018** 
(3.96) 
-0.009** 
(3.43) 
-
0.0008 
(0.18) 
Instability coefficient (C of 
V) of agricultural share 
    -0.1268** 
(3.99) 
0.34* 
(2.05) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
Share of education and 
infrastructure in total exp-
enditure (‘edinfrashare’) 
    -0.020 
(0.46) 
-0.27 
(1.93) 
-0.44 
(1.00) 
Growth of edinfrashare     0.002** 
(4.95) 
0.0028 
(0.92) 
-0.009 
(1.93) 
Ln(educational 
expenditure, primary level) 
    0.010* 
(2.13) 
-0.073* 
(2.42) 
-0.13** 
(2.56) 
Share of military 
expenditure in GDP 
 -0.12* 
(3.69) 
-0.0007 
(0.03) 
 -0.081** 
(3.16) 
  
Growth of military share  -
0.0019* 
(3.92) 
-0.002** 
(5.39) 
 -0.0023** 
(5.32) 
  
Aid ratios 
 Aid as % GDP,lagged two 
periods) 
0.86** 
(43.6) 
0.037* 
(2.13) 
0.052** 
(3.47) 
0.095** 
(5.36) 
0.063** 
(4.14) 
0.065 
(0.73) 
0.53** 
(3.42) 
        
Growth of aid/GNP ratio  7.42E-
06 
(0.30) 
-
0.00002 
(0.32) 
0.00004 
(1.76) 
-9.3E-08 
(0.00) 
0.00009 
(0.92) 
0.0002 
(1.52) 
Aid to Africa  -0.019 
(0.59) 
0.19** 
(6.65) 
-0.17** 
(4.39) 
0.089** 
(3.16) 
0.17 
(1.00) 
 
Instability(coefficient of 
variation) of aid/GNP ratio 
 -0.24** 
(5.42) 
-0.24** 
(6.32) 
-0.13** 
(2.61) 
-0.37** 
(10.52) 
-0.023 
(1.09) 
0.44 
(1.23) 
Agricultural economy 
 
       
Ln (agricultural productivity 
per hectare (foodcrops)) 
     -0.85** 
(2.66) 
-0.79 
(1.52) 
Ln (Food production per 
capita) 
     -0.22* 
(2.42) 
-0.70** 
(2.57) 
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Ln (nonfood agricultural 
production per capita) 
     -0.032 
(0.53) 
0.038 
(0.37) 
Ln (total agricultural 
production index per 
capita) 
     -0.75 
(1.86) 
-1.09** 
(3.94) 
Ln(Rural population 
density) 
    0.097** 
(8.37) 
0.52** 
(2.85) 
0.14 
(0.45) 
Ln(total rural population)      -0.012 
(0.60) 
-0.032 
(0.89) 
Ln(fertiliser/hectare)     0.31** 
(16.35) 
  
Ln(irrigation/hectare)     4.34** 
(10.98) 
  
Ln 
(fertiliser*irrigation/hectare) 
    -0.056** 
(6.39) 
  
Ln(rural population, non-
agricultural) 
     -0.024 
(0.78) 
-0.06 
(0.40) 
Dummies and fixed 
effects 
Regional dummy 1, Asia 
0.15 
(1.75) 
-0.080 
(0.076) 
-0.11 
(1.76) 
0.072 
(0.81) 
0.022 
(0.35) 
0.29 
(0.79) 
0.18 
(0.29) 
Regional dummy 2, Latin 
America 
-0.008 
(0.11) 
-0.76* 
(10.22) 
-0.23** 
(3.53) 
-0.032 
(0.38) 
-0.24** 
(3.11) 
0.77 
(1.83) 
1.19 
(1.63) 
Regional dummy 3, Africa 0.23** 
(3.19) 
-0.16** 
(1.59) 
-0.54** 
(6.33) 
0.051 
(0.47) 
-0.50** 
(5.05) 
0.72 
(1.29) 
1.77 
(1.82) 
Country size 
(ln(population)) 
-0.089** 
(3.91) 
      
Country fixed effects 0.001 
(0.55) 
0.004** 
(2.72) 
-0.003** 
(2.75) 
0.0044* 
(2.30) 
0.002 
(1.50) 
-0.001 
(0.12) 
-0.020 
(1.54) 
Year (since 1980) fixed 
effects 
-0.021** 
(4.53) 
-0.005 
(1.67) 
0.0003 
(0.003) 
-0.015** 
(3.74) 
0.0026 
(1.39) 
0.027 
(1.55) 
0.041 
(0.03) 
Ln(Gini coefficient of 
inequality) 
     0.24** 
(4.31) 
0.03 
(0.32) 
Ln (Infant mortality, lagged 
one period) 
0.014 
(1.72) 
      
Sachs-Warner openness 
measure 
-0.073 
(1.91) 
-
0.089** 
(4.49) 
-0.025 
(0.017) 
-0.039 
(1.44) 
0.066 
(1.49) 
0.022 
(0.22) 
0.31 
(1.69) 
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.8769 0.4222 0.2851 0.1402 0.7400 0.1137 0.1147 
Number of 
observations 
614 614 614 614 614 614 614 
Sources: Aid data from OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less 
Developed Countries. Agricultural data from FAO Production Yearbooks. 
Notes: (1) Agr= agricultural expenditure, E+I = educational and infrastructural expenditure, 
Mil = military expenditure 
(2) PovHC = poverty headcount (%) below $1/day poverty line, InfMor = infant mortality rate 
(per 1000 live births) 
 
 
 
Country sample: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Rep., Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Romania, Senegal, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Maximum of 
22 observations on each country over the period 1980-2002. 
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Various preliminary conclusions emerge from Table 1, working back up the 
chain of causation from the right-hand end of the table, that is to say from 
poverty to its causes: 
  
First, as noted by Irz, Thirtle et al. (equation 4) total agricultural productivity 
(both in the sense of output per unit of land and of labour) has a significant 
negative influence on indices of poverty, especially on the infant mortality 
definition. The headcount poverty indicator is (as predicted  by Dorward et 
al.)4, more responsive to yields and production of foodcrops than non-food 
crops, even though labour-intensity – one of the correlates of poverty 
reduction - is highest of all for some non-cereal crops, notably horticulture. 
The crop-mix is further considered in the next section of the paper. The 
instability of total government expenditure and its agricultural component have 
a direct negative bearing on poverty. 
 
Second, (equation 3), agricultural productivity – we focus on foodcrops in view 
of their higher poverty leverage - is significantly influenced by various 
categories of expenditure – in particular educational and infrastructural (in a 
positive sense) and military expenditure (in a negative sense),and negatively 
influenced by instability of government expenditure,  allowing for country and 
year fixed effects and holding constant known ‘classic’ long-period influences 
on agricultural yields such as population density. If aid can influence these 
variables, it is therefore reasonable to expect it to be able to influence poverty; 
and it also has a significant direct impact on foodcrop yields (row  15 of the 
table) .  As we shall illustrate in the case-study analysis of Section 3, both 
stability and the intersectoral distribution of expenditure are heavily driven by 
political variables, and specifically by fiscal strength and by the sense of 
danger associated with food insecurity. Relevantly for proponents of the so-
called ‘Washington consensus on agriculture’ (Binswanger and Townsend 
2000), the Sachs-Warner openness variable is insignificant.  
 
Third (equation 2), aid does positively influence both of the types of 
expenditure -directly in support of agriculture and on education and 
infrastructure – which, from the previous equation, are beneficial for 
agricultural yields and thus pro-poor. Instability of aid is a negative influence 
on these types of expenditure and their effectiveness, for reasons discussed 
earlier. Military expenditure and, interestingly, a high Sachs-Warner coefficient 
of openness are negative for levels of agricultural support expenditure5: it is 
possible to observe cases, notably that of Ethiopia described in more detail in 
the next section, and less dramatically Uganda, Cambodia and Mozambique, 
where the conversion of swords into ploughshares had a clear and visible 
poverty dividend.   
 
                                                 
4 ‘Intensive cereal-based countries’ agricultural growth has in the past provided the greatest 
potential for sustained pro-poor agricultural growth’(2002:16), 
4 We suggest that this is because, in countries which were open to effective pressure from the 
Washington institutions, governments were forced to cut total real public expenditure and in 
such cases the axe tended to fall on the politically weakest sectors, of which agriculture was 
almost invariably one (Mosley and Smith 1989) 
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Finally (equation 1), aid flows are responsive to country poverty levels. This is 
now a common and completely orthodox result, but it does influence the 
manner in which aid impact is modelled. 
 
The econometric evidence thus provides useful initial confirmation of our story 
that expenditure allocation within recipient countries and aid instability are 
important correlates of aid effectiveness against poverty, which implies that if 
aid donors can get a handle on these variables they may be able to influence 
poverty as well. Is this a feasible hope? We can expect that it will be only if  
donors are able to exercise influence on recipient expenditure patterns, rapid 
and sustained growth of agricultural productivity can be achieved in the poorer 
countries, and most important of all, the internal political support required to 
achieve high and stable levels of pro-agricultural expenditure, which was so 
important in India, Indonesia and China,  can be replicated in Africa. The 
degree of political impetus behind agricultural support expenditure is, as  we 
saw earlier, argued by Lele and Goldsmith (1989:335) to be one of the key 
differences between North India during its green revolution and ‘Africa today’; 
but Africa is changing, and one of the key developments of the nineties has 
been the emergence of pro-poor African governments with their own pro-
agriculture philosophy. What are the chances of this philosophy being 
disseminated, and consequently impacting on yields and poverty? 
 
In the next section we focus on Africa, which is the most aid-dependent region 
of the world, and examine these questions in relation to two matched pairs of 
countries. In the first two of these countries, Uganda and Ethiopia, agricultural 
productivity has shown a sustained increase and poverty has fallen (Table 2); 
in the other two, Zimbabwe and Malawi, productivity has faltered and poverty 
trends vary, according to the source examined, from unpromising to 
catastrophic. What can be learned from this contrast which will provide 
enlightenment concerning patterns of causation and, as a consequence, 
lessons for aid donors and other policy-makers? 
 
 
3. Pathways of impact: case studies 
 
              We can begin by examining the impact, in our case-study 
countries, of the variables which emerged as significant influences on poverty 
in the econometric analysis of Section 2: the composition and stability of 
public expenditure, and the influence on these of aid policy. We are 
particularly interested in equation (2) of the econometric analysis, that which 
goes from the politically-determined allocation of expenditures between 
sectors to agricultural productivity. The approach taken here is that the impact  
of public expenditures on poverty depends on their ability to protect the poor 
against risk. It is a commonplace that risk is an important barrier to escape 
from poverty, and may form part of a vicious circle in which vulnerability 
precludes innovation and change in life-patterns, which preserves poverty, 
which precludes innovation. The essay by Wood (2003) embodies this 
approach in the idea of a ‘Faustian bargain’: the poor deliberately choose to 
stay poor in order to avoid embracing risks which they feel they cannot 
handle, and in consequence find themselves caught in a long-term chronic 
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poverty trap.  We have already argued  that aid strategies may be able to 
spring this trap at macro- level by means of  a more stable and more pro-poor 
focussed pattern of expenditure, and now examine how this can also be done 
at micro-level. 
 
 In Figure 5, we consider the process by which low-income rural people 
may escape from poverty by acquiring assets such as new seeds, fertilisers 
and other productivity-raising equipment. These assets are depicted on the 
vertical axis. 
 The right-hand part of Figure 5 is a conventional isoquant diagram: it 
shows the optimal agricultural technology shifting from a low-input optimum 
(such as A) to a high-input optimum (such as B) as the price line steepens 
under the impetus of population pressure and land shortage. These pressures 
may, according to the argument of Hayami and Ruttan(1970) stimulate both 
technical and institutional innovation. The process may be artificially 
accelerated by policies which make land more expensive or capital cheaper – 
such as capital subsidies, or any of the ‘expenditures in support of agriculture’ 
discussed in the econometric analysis of table 1 above. One major difficulty 
which we have observed with these policies is that they may be fiscally 
unsustainable, as they have proved to be in many countries under structural 
adjustment, and specifically in the countries indicated. Once abandoned, it 
may be difficult to effectively reinstate such policies, as they may be perceived 
from past experience as transient and  ‘non-credible’. 
 There is a more fundamental difficulty with relying on such policies 
alone to force agricultural development, which is the difficulty described by 
Wood and others. This is that low-income farmers, indeed low-income people 
of any description, may be reluctant to adopt capital assets whose acquisition 
involves an unacceptable degree of risk – they make the ‘Faustian decision’ to 
stay poor to avoid risk. This problem is represented as a constraint on choice 
in the left-hand half of Figure 5. We imagine that individuals are motivated so 
as at all costs to prevent the value of their assets falling below a specific 
‘disaster’ level, indicated as D on Figure 5. To prevent this happening, they  
behave so  that the probability of a ‘disaster’ level of assets is set below a less 
than a specified precautionary level, which in the illustration given,  is 1%. A 
line drawn two standard deviations away from the vertical axis satisfies the 
condition that Y-2SD(Y) = D, in other words that the probability of disaster is 
1% or less. The line satisfying this condition is drawn as a boundary-line in the 
left-hand half of Figure 5, which defines the boundary between a safe zone (to 
the east of the line DE) within which there is a less than 1% probability of 
disaster and a risky zone (to the west of the line DE) within which there is a 
higher than 1% probability of disaster. Thus individuals optimise their position 
so as to stay within this boundary-line: formally, they position themselves so 
that their risk-yield trade-off (the set of technical possibilities available to them) 
touches but does not cross the boundary of the safe zone. If this risk-
constrained optimum (say at C) is associated with a lower level of assets than 
that implied by a risk-ignoring optimum such as B, then that is binding on them 
and forms a constraint on their acquisition of assets. This is the nature of the 
‘Faustian bargain’ and it may be a real poverty trap eg. households  are 
deterred by lack of asset protection from investing in water-harvesting 
methods which might protect them against drought even though they have 
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experienced its ravages, and so they do not, and so when a drought comes 
along, as in Malawi or Zimbabwe in 2002,  they are defenceless. 
 The empirical argument of this paper has, however, indicated a 
possible exit from the trap. This is to devise a combination of technical and 
fiscal strategies such that it becomes possible to increase productivity without 
increasing risk (such as ‘strategy 2’ on figure 5). Such strategies may be seen 
as potential ladders out of poverty. Illustrations of such strategies include 
large-scale public investment in water-harvesting and other minor irrigation 
methods in semi-arid areas, as in Ethiopia during the 1990s; development of 
short-season hybrids and composites which raise the expectation of yield and 
at the same time improve the ‘worst-case yield’ under deficient rainfall; and 
maintenance of credit and extension services which the farmer can rely on 
year after year- rather than commit herself to a new technology which requires 
continuing advice and moral support and discover one day  that the extension 
service is not there, as occurred all over Africa during the years of structural. 
The role of aid in this context, which we have illustrated in relation to Uganda 
and Ethiopia, is to provide stable support for expenditures which make the 
provision of these inputs possible. Aid which becomes more stable or focuses 
the budget more effectively on pro-agriculture expenditures increases the 
likelihood that farmers can climb ‘ladder 2’ out of the poverty trap, both by 
giving them the confidence that their adoption of productivity-raising inputs will 
not take them across the risk frontier and by giving them the expectation that 
the personal relationships which underpin their acquisition of these inputs can 
be trusted and will continue. This is the fundamental driving force, we 
believe,behind the measured effectiveness of pro-agricultural expenditure 
against poverty in Table 1. We now demonstrate this principle in relation to 
the four case-study countries. 
 
 
At the macro-level, as illustrated by Table 2 below, expenditure in the ‘poverty 
priority’ sectors identified in Table 1 (agricultural research and extension, 
infrastructure, and education) has been on a rapid growth trend as a share of 
total expenditure in the ‘sustained green revolution’ countries, whereas it has 
been falling in the other two6; and it has been relatively stable in Uganda and 
Ethiopia, and severely unstable in Zimbabwe. In Malawi, where we have IMF 
data only for the 1980s, there is some appearance of stability during that 
period but during the 1990s there are wild swings in several components of 
public spending crucial to smallholder productivity, including agricultural credit, 
the smallholder subsidy (which was finally abolished in 1994 after many years 
of struggle with World Bank negotiators) and expenditures on the salaries and 
running costs of the extension service. These components of agricultural 
support expenditure are then graphed for each country on Figures 3a and 3b, 
to enable the time-series pattern of government inputs and agricultural yields 
for the case-study countries to be inspected.
 
6 In the 1990s in Zimbabwe ‘real government spending on extension declined considerably’ (Poulton et 
al 2002:7) 
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Table 2. ‘Sustained’ versus ‘stalled’ green revolution countries: 
contrasts in aid flows and policy stance7
 
Unless otherwise specified data relate to the sample period 1980-2003, or closest available data. 
 (1)Aid policy 
parameters 
(2)Expenditure 
allocation 
(3)Agricultura
l yields 
(4)Poverty trend 
Country cases  
(Donor-recipient 
distrust score in 
brackets)(4) 
Aid as % 
GNP 
average 
1980-2001 
Aid 
stability 
(C of V) 
1990-
2003 
Pro-
agriculture 
spending 
(ag + ed+ 
infra) 
Average 
1980-2002(3) 
Instability 
index 
(coefficient of 
variation) of 
total pro-
agriculture 
spending 
Average 
1980-2002 
 
Averag
e 
cereal 
yields 
(kg/ha) 
2001-3 
Trend 
1981-83 
to 2001-
03 
Headcount 
(national poverty 
line) 
Infant 
mortality 
(1980-
98) 
Sustained green 
revolution:high 
political commitment 
        
Ethiopia(1) 12.1 30.0 37.7 26.9 1292 +7 Fall from 
51%(1992) (1)to 
44%(2000) 
-31% 
Uganda(0) 11.0 24.6 43.0 26.7 1651 +14 Fall from 50% 
(in 1992) to 32% 
(2000) 
-13% 
Average, 
sustained green 
revolution cases 
11.6 27.3 40.4 26.8 1471 +11 Sustained 
improvement 
-22% 
Political commitment 
lapsed: green 
revolution initiated 
but aborted 
        
Zimbabwe(6) 4.6 51.5 32.1 44.3 763 -44 Increase from 
25%(1990) to 
35%(1996).  By 
2002 ‘more than 
60%’(4) 
-9% 
Malawi(3) 22.1 25.3 37.2(3) 14.5(3) 1116 -4 Increase from 
54%(1990) to 
65%(1998) 
-21% 
Average, 
abortive green 
revolution cases 
13.4 38.4 34.6 29.4 939 -24 Sustained 
deterioration 
-15% 
Africa (south of 
the Sahara) 
Average 
7.0 .. 43.1 40.6 1245 +28 Increase from 
217m(1987) to 
291m(1998) (as 
% of 
population, 
level at 46%) (2) 
-20% 
Asia(developing) 
average 
1.2 .. 45.1 21.6 3251 +47 Decline from 
891m(1987) to 
800m(1998) (as 
% of population 
fell from 35% to 
28%) (2) 
-37% 
 
                                                 
7 Sources: FAO Agrostat database for crop yields; World Bank World Development Indicators 2003 and World 
Development Indicators for other data, plus additional sources as follows: 
(1) Ethiopia poverty 1992 from Dercon(2003) 
(2) Global poverty data: from World Bank, World Development Report 2000, table 1.1, using $1/day poverty 
line. 
(3) Data on components of government expenditure from   IMF, Government Expenditure Statistics 
Yearbook (IMF-GESY),  various. For Malawi, IMF-GESY quotes data from 1980-89 only.  
(4) The ‘distrust score’ is the number of times that IMF or World Bank budget support disbursements were 
interrupted over the period 1985-2003. See Mosley and Suleiman(2005), appendix. 
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  Thus, as in the cross-country analysis of Table 1, so amongst these 
case studies, we are able to provide support for the hypothesis that greater 
stability of aid and a more pro-agricultural pattern of expenditure were positive 
for aid’s poverty impact. The case studies, however, also shed light on the 
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processes by which this impact occurred, which are deeply embedded in the 
politics of the recipient country. Three aspects of this linkage are sufficiently 
important that we can describe them, on the evidence of the case studies, as 
crucial for the sustaining of stable pro-poor expenditure patterns: 
 
1 Policies which are.‘protectional’ of low income groups. 
              Our first main argument is that those African countries which have 
achieved sustainable growth visualised aid inflows as part of a long-term 
process which anticipated and insured against some of the likely risks, rather 
than a short-term injection of resources which was vulnerable to those risks: 
they rejected, in A.K. Sen’s terminology,  a ’promotional’ approach8 , in which 
factor prices are deliberately twisted in a pro-capital direction by subsidy in 
order to motivate an intensive use of land by smallholders (right-hand part of 
Figure 5), and favoured a ‘protectional’ approach , in which incentives to 
higher productivity are provided by reducing the risks to which vulnerable 
households are subjected (left-hand part of Figure 5). Firstly, climatic risks 
were controlled, especially in Ethiopia, through the pattern of investment., 
especially in rainfall-deficit areas( for example, the government of Tigray has 
been particularly proactive in the installation of earth dams, terraces and other 
defences against drought), and $250mn has been committed from the (central 
Ethiopian) government budget to water-harvesting in drought-vulnerable 
northern areas alone during the financial year 2003-4, a rainfall-deficit year in 
which one might have expected short-term priorities to predominate. This was 
also important for the long-term sustainability of modern varieties use and, 
thence, of yields: with irrigation available, the risk that drought would cause 
disaster or demotivate the use of improved varieties was considerably 
reduced, and with climatic shocks converting into smaller production shocks9, 
the stability of the whole economy – and hence of government expenditure 
itself – was improved. Secondly, risks were mitigated at the level of research 
and extension. At the level of breeding, there was more emphasis in Uganda 
at least  on the development of composite open-pollinated varieties (Longe 1-
5) which have lower average yields than hybrids but can be resown from seed 
year after year, and therefore leave the farmer with lower set-up costs and 
fewer risks associated with dependence on the commercial input supply 
chain. And further downstream, extension staff had more drought-resistant 
planting materials available to them to promote and, on a subjective judgment, 
more awareness of the need to introduce risk analysis into the extension 
message10: as a consequence,  the likelihood of Southern African farmers 
                                                 
8 Arrow 1 in Figure 5. 
9 In 2002, when there was a rainfall shortfall of about 30% in much of southern Africa, crop yields fell 
in Malawi by 38% (from 1675 to 1045 kg/ha) and in Zimbabwe by 69% (from 1199 to 378 kg/ha). The 
following year there was a drought of more or less equivalent magnitude in Ethiopia, and yields fell by 
only 1% (from 1345 to 1334 kg/ha). We surmise that this is because the Ethiopian government had 
made the smallholder economy better prepared against climatic risk.   
10 Estimates of the proportion of the maize acreage sown to modern varieties are as follows: 
 
 Sown to modern varieties(1997, 
national data) 
% of modern varieties acreage 
sown to composites (2003, 
sample data) 
Zimbabwe 70 23 
South Africa 88 14(Sensako, Kalahari) 
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receiving a negative surprise from the use of modern varieties, specifically in 
drought years such as 1992 and 2002, was greater  than in Uganda and 
Ethiopia, given the range of cultivars available.  In Ethiopia, credit was linked 
in with the supply of extension, and thanks to very effective loan-recovery 
technologies very similar to those adopted by the Indonesian regional 
microfinance authorities,it proved possible to expand the supply of rural 
microcredit in a stable manner (Figure 3b), in strong contrast to the 
experience of Malawi and Zimbabwe11. The poverty focus agreed with the aid 
donors also entailed strong proactive measures by extension staffs to offset 
previous biases against women farmers, and in Uganda at least these appear 
to have borne fruit, in the sense that in a sample in Mbale district surveyed by 
the author, women farmers in partnership households, contrary to the normal  
African pattern, have higher average maize yields than male farmers (Mosley 
2003; table 7.2).  Finally,  fiscal risks were controlled, in Uganda and Ethiopia, 
by avoiding large-scale deficit financing of credit  and other development 
expenditures, - in this respect deviating from the model which had brought 
success in much of Asia12. In particular, and by explicit contrast with Malawi 
and Zimbabwe, subsidies on inputs including credit were avoided13; and yet 
(Figure 3 above) smallholder credit was able to grow steadily on this basis in 
Uganda and Ethiopia, whereas it nosedived in Zimbabwe (after 1987) and in 
Malawi (after 1994).  There was, by contrast with Asian experience, very 
substantial delegation not only of smallholder credit but of agricultural 
extension and even applied research to NGOs such as the Sasakawa 
Foundation (Howard et al, 1999) The general approach, in other words, was 
protectional of the ministry of finance, as well as of the small farmer – in 
particular, the hands-off approach adopted by both governments helped to 
prevent the disappearance of much of the development budget into a black 
hole of defaulted agricultural debt, which as we have seen was a major factor 
behind the eventual crash of the Zimbabwe Agricultural Finance Corporation 
                                                                                                                                            
Malawi 35  
Uganda 70 74 
Ethiopia  Na 
Source; column 1, CIMMYT, Survey of maize research Impacts 1998:column 2, survey data from 
agro-economic surveys carried out in 2002-03 in Phokoane(South Africa), Mbale(Uganda) and 
Zvishavane(Zimbabwe), details in Mosley and Rock (2002) and Mosley et al. (2003) 
 We also argue in P.Mosley, Extension, farmer-decision making and the spread of the African green 
revolution,  Gatsby Occasional Paper 3, 2000, table 3.6, that the Ugandan extension style takes 
particular care to  make farmers aware of the risks attached to particular extension recommendations. 
11 The scheme is operated by the state-financed Commercial Bank of Ethiopia but highly decentralised. 
Loan arrears are recovered from the provincial governments, which also operate the extension service 
an se the extension agents, as in Indonesia, to recover them from clients.  d u
12  In Uganda and Ethiopia ,the stance of agricultural policy (summarised in table 4 below), 
intriguingly,  deviates much further  from the successful‘ Asian policy model’ than is the case in 
Malawi and Zimbabwe – in Ethiopia and Uganda there is no input subsidy and no state control of 
foodcrop marketing, and although the Ethiopian government does disburse smallholder credit, it has 
imposed tight financial discipline on these credits,  in part by devolving many agricultural policy 
responsibilities to regional governments and getting them to act as guarantors, on the Indonesian model 
. As a consequence, credit flows to the smallholder sector have been sustained in Ethiopia and Uganda 
(figure 1) whereas they have collapsed in Zimbabwe and Malawi12. (and also, incidentally, smallholder 
South Africa, which also experienced an ‘aborted green revolution’ over the course of the 1990s) .  
 
13 The Malawi fertiliser subsidy was removed, chaotically, in 1994. 
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(AFC) and the Malawian Smallholder Agricultural Credit Authority (SACA) – 
and of their associated green revolutions.   When those state agricultural 
credit institutions ran out of money there was no fiscal momentum in the 
private or NGO sector to take up the slack, with the result that small-farm 
yields fell.   
            As one might expect both from the character of protectional strategies 
and also from the relative factor endowments of the two countries’ small-farm 
sectors, the results of these programmes in terms of productivity were 
relatively slow in appearing, with a focus in both Uganda and Ethiopia 
throughout the early 1990s on area expansion rather than the dramatic yield 
increases seen ephemerally in Mashonaland (northern, eastern and central 
Zimbabwe), north-central Malawi, and the South African homelands. But 
under the impetus of effective extension, yields did build up also in the late 
nineties, most spectacularly in Ugandan cassava, a classic drought-resistant 
‘protectional’ crop, whose yields have doubled since 1996; but in Ethiopia 
also, foodcrop production grew, according to FAOSTAT data,  by 69% 
between 1994 and 200314. The sustainability of these successes, in poverty 
and conflict reduction as well as in agricultural growth, then bred a virtuous 
circle – including the reward of debt cancellation by donors under HIPC -   and 
this helped to avert the ‘fiscal turning-point’  which brought down Malawi, 
Zimbabwe, and also, outside our sample, Kenya and even South Africa15. In 
Malawi, the risks facing peasant farmers were further increased by the 
dissolution of the state-financed ADMARC (Agricultural Development and 
Marketing Corporation) system which, for all its faults, had offered them a 
measure of protection against risks associated with the input supply chain 
(Harrigan 1995, Kydd and Dorward 2002) and in Zimbabwe, by the 
liberalisation and then reimposition in a harsher form of the Grain Marketing 
Board16.The Ethiopian/Ugandan strategy was more sparing of scarce skills 
and investible resources, and therefore less vulnerable to being blown off 
course by political and climatic shocks, and therefore easier to keep on course 
– and again we have seen, in the previous section, the payoff to stability of 
policy.  
 
 
2.Stable relations between aid donors and recipients. In Africa especially the 
fiscal stability of most countries is dependent on aid flows, and aid donors 
were crucial in enabling Uganda and Ethiopia to achieve the long-term 
‘protectional’ strategies described above. We have observed, in table 1 above, 
columns 2 and 3 , a positive and significant correlation in our case-study 
countries between levels of aid, stability of aid, and levels of the pro-
agriculture expenditures on which we focus (agricultural support, education, 
and infrastructure), just as there is a negative correlation between aid levels 
and military expenditure. In other words, contrary to the recent disclaimers of 
                                                 
14 In the same publication the Government also claims that the number of farmers reached through the 
national extension programme rose from 32,000 to 2.8 million – that is to about 37% of the farming 
population – and that maize yields for this group of participating farmers rose from 1.2 tons per hectare 
in 1994/95 to 4.7 tons per hectare in 1999/2000. 
15 For the case of South Africa see Mosley and Suleiman(2004) 
16 As of late 2004 the GMB was confiscating private consignments of more than five bags of maize, 
sometimes without  compensation (BBC 2004) 
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the World Bank (Collier 1999; World Bank 2000), ‘conditionality works’17, 
across this country sample at least. But this is not old-fashioned ultimatum 
conditionality, nor is there a homogeneous and mechanical response of 
expenditure patterns to aid donors and their advice. Rather, we argue (Mosley 
and Suleiman 2005) the conditionality process in some countries builds up 
social capital, or trust, between negotiators for the donor and recipient, and in 
some cases fails to do so, and the level of social capital then impacts on aid 
composition and stability. In Uganda and Ethiopia, policy dialogue from the 
late 1980s through the middle 1990s was tense, with the government of 
Uganda insisting on a measure of resistance to exchange-rate movements 
and on its right to impose coffee export taxes in 1994, and the government of 
Ethiopia insisting on continued government ownership of all land, in face of 
explicit donor opposition. However, this opposition was not expressed in the 
form of a threat: the recipients compromised by drafting a coherent , home-
grown and poverty-focussed expenditure framework in the requisite idiom18, 
and the donors compromised by sustained aid flows ( the relatively lower 
coefficient of variation is observable in Table 3), with the consequence that 
these tensions melted somewhat, and trust between the parties was able to 
grow. This is what in Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004) we describe as 
‘new conditionality’: donor influence achieved through an implicit rather than 
an explicit bargaining game, with the recipients able and willing to make an 
opening bid within the context of a coherent anti-poverty framework. Contrast 
the cases of Malawi and Zimbabwe. In Malawi, the government did not have a 
consistent development philosophy to govern its negotiating stance, but 
became involved in an unstable agricultural- policy dialogue with donors 
whose instability was in large part the donors’ fault (first resisting donor 
pressure to abolish fertiliser subsidies, for example, in the early 1980s, 
abolishing them in 1985, reintroducing them at a higher rate than before in 
1987, receiving donor approval for their reintroduction in 1990, and finally 
abolishing them in 1994 after donor approval was rescinded)19 ; but the end 
result  of this instability was to destroy the structure of incentives to 
smallholder maize producers which the government had spent most of the 
1980s and 90s trying to erect. In Zimbabwe, again, there was an unstable 
dialogue with donors, but more of the responsibility for the instabilities rests 
with the Zimbabwe government: the donors were embraced after 
independence in 1980, retreated from when they sought to impose structural 
adjustment in the mid-eighties, surrendered to in 1991-2, and finally and 
                                                 
17 See also Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004), table 3 and Figure 1    . 
18 The Permanent Secretary to the Uganda Ministry of Finance described the process as follows: ‘In a 
way, our poverty strategy came about as a by-product of our structural adjustment programme. Last 
year [1993] we were asked by the donors to make serious proposals for retrenchment of public servants 
in order to make the requisite cuts in planned public expenditure. At the same time, we were asked to 
introduce an anti-poverty programme which went beyond the expedients then in force [ie, PAPSCA, 
the Programme (or social fund) for Alleviating the Social Costs of Adjustment] . So we proposed to 
exempt from cuts the sectors of public expenditure which had clear anti-poverty potential – primary 
health and education, rural water and infrastructure, agricultural research and extension. This list was 
intuitive – it was not based on research.’ Emanuel Tumusime-Mutabile, interview with author and other 
members of ILO team, 3 November, 1994.Intuitive as the list may have been, it shows remarkably 
close correspondence with the ‘pro-poor expenditure’ which we have demonstrated to increase pro-
poor effectiveness (Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor 2004, and Table 1 above) 
19 See Harrigan(2003) for a detailed account of these and other policy reversals (by government and 
donors) in Malawi. 
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brusquely rejected in 2000 as a by-product of the Mugabe government’s 
policy of securing land for ‘war veterans’ and other government clients through 
land invasions.  
 
What is significant for the present argument is that whereas in Uganda and 
Ethiopia an increasingly harmonious policy dialogue, rooted in a clear anti-
poverty strategy, bred stability in aid flows and thence in public expenditure20, 
which we have observed to be a key determinant of growth and poverty 
outcomes, so in Malawi and especially in Zimbabwe in the absence of such a 
strategy (Kenya under Moi and possibly Zambia under Chiluba are also 
relevant cases) there was a decumulation of social capital between donor and 
recipient which led to instability in developmental expenditure and a negative 
poverty dividend. In table 2, this difference is embodied in a higher ‘distrust 
score’ (number of programme interruptions) in the last two countries than in 
the first two. Expenditure instability, in other words, is not exogenous, but 
reflects the trust relations between donor and recipient. The question to which 
this then leads is how trust is built, which the large social capital literature (e.g. 
O’Neill 2002, Glaeser et al 2002, Barr 2003) has not been definitively able to 
resolve21. What is clear is that the willingness of Uganda and Ethiopia to 
articulate and defend a coherent anti-poverty strategy, which they then were 
able to operationalise through their expenditure allocations, enabled them to 
build a reputation with the donors for trustworthiness in the important things22. 
Credibility bred trust, and trust then generated a stable aid flow. 
 
 
 
 
3. The sustaining of fiscal strength and pro-poor political commitment. 
            No green revolution in history, whether in China or South Korea or 
North India or anywhere in Africa, has been a private sector-driven process; 
all have depended on a high level of state commitment in order to overcome 
the multiple market failures encountered in rural input and labour markets. In 
most of Africa, such state commitment as existed to forcing the smallholder 
green revolution in the 1980s (as in Zimbabwe, smallholder South Africa and 
Malawi), as we have observed, was rapidly undone by the rigours of structural 
adjustment, since when the IMF and other creditors demanded cuts, capital 
spending in support of smallholder agriculture proved invariably to be one of 
the first sectors selected by those governments to be cut to balance the 
books, and a downward drift of agricultural support spending, as we have 
                                                 
20 The argument of this paper refers to the years 1991 to 2004. At the time of writing, in June 2005, 
several donors have suspended aid to Ethiopia following outbreaks of violence pending the 
announcement of the election result. The extent to which this will cause long-term disruption in the 
politics of Ethiopia and in its aid flows is not yet clear. 
21 For an analysis of trust-building in budget support negotiations, see Mosley and Suleiman (2005). 
This paper considers three classes of trust-building factors: initiatives by the recipient (which establish 
a reputation for credibility, and distract attention from unsatisfactory performance; key signals of policy 
and institutional stance such as expenditure priorities and low corruption levels; and  procedural 
factors such as frequency of meetings with donors, stability of personnel, existence of a resident 
mission, etc. 
22 For modelling of the growth and decumulation of trust between donor and recipient see Mosley and 
Suleiman (2005) 
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seen, is one of the factors which has caused productivity surges to self-
destruct (Mosley and Suleiman 2004) . In Uganda and Ethiopia, as we have 
observed (Figure 3), the evolution of spending priorities was different, and the 
iron law that agricultural support expenditure, in times of crisis, must always 
go to the back of the queue turned out to be disproved.  African experience 
therefore offers, around a mean of very weak growth in agricultural support 
spending (Mosley and Suleiman, 2004, table 1) two different patterns of  
political priorities and thence of expenditure patterns. Which of the two 
tendencies dominates in future is likely, on our analysis, to be crucial for 
poverty trends.  
            In seeking to understand the higher level of political commitment  to 
pro-agriculture expenditures in Uganda and Ethiopia, we note that those two 
regimes, in the early 1990s, were reconstructing after a long period of civil 
conflict – and, in the case of Ethiopia, also reforming a command economy.  
Fear of renewed conflict certainly acted as a force to concentrate political 
weight in support of, rather than conceding cuts in, the agricultural 
development budget , just as it did in the early years of the Malawi and 
Zimbabwe programmes (and for that matter in the Indonesia and India of the 
1960s also)23. In Ethiopia the fear was justified, as war with Eritrea broke out 
again in 2000, causing a temporary suspension of debt-relief aid 
disbursements. Fear of renewed famine has also, ever since 1984 (BBC, 
2004) been a spur behind the government of  Ethiopia, as it had been behind 
the government of China in the 1970s. But, much more than the governments 
of Southern Africa, Uganda and Ethiopia not only employed but took the 
initiative in moulding the anti-poverty rhetoric that has now become a 
commonplace of development policy: they realised that in the new political 
economy of heavy pressure towards democracy and aid allocations governed 
by pro-poor commitments, a pro-poor politics had the potential to be an 
effective politics (Mosley 2004) for seeking to placate disaffected groups and 
hold the country together24. Of course, democracy in both countries has been 
imperfect, with opposition parties being banned altogether in Uganda and in 
Ethiopia effectively neutralised by elections arranged (until April 2005) to 
favour the inter-tribal EPRDF governing coalition25; but enough pressure was 
coming from the grass-roots to make the political pay-off to pro-poor policies 
such as smallholder development and universal primary education immensely 
greater than it had been in the 1970s and 1980s. Implementation of these 
policies varied between the two country cases. The government of Uganda in 
1994 exempted six sectors of public expenditure, of which two were 
agricultural research and extension (the others were primary health and 
education, and rural water and road-building) from cuts being made under the 
structural adjustment programme26. The Ethiopian strategy of agricultural 
                                                 
23 There is some evidence from regressions that a high rate of agricultural growth is negatively 
associated with conflict: see Nafziger and Auvinen (2000) 
24 This has not always been appreciated, and some writers on the political economy of developing 
countries have explicitly denied it. Haggard and Morrisson, for example, have written 
 
(1995, page    ). 
25 For discussion of limitations on democracy in these two countries, see the papers by   Bratton and 
Lambright (2001) and Abbay(2004) 
26 Emanuel Mutabile-Tumusime, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance: see note 8  above; 
reiterated in Government of Uganda 2001,page 6. 
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development-led industrialisation (ADLI)27  again was a pro-poor initiative 
conceived by, rather than forced on government; it was planned in exile by the 
Tigray People’s Liberation Front before it came into office, and explicitly based 
on the agricultural development policy models of Taiwan and South Korea 
(Rock 2003). As in Uganda, there was emphasis on administrative 
decentralisation, on diffusion of extension services to small-scale farmers in 
high-potential areas, and on the development of human capital through 
expansion of the coverage of primary health care and primary education. Thus 
the philosophy governing the overall development strategy came from 
government, whereas elsewhere in Africa it continued to come from the aid 
donors:  this was one of the first cases in the history of IFI-government 
interactions - in which an African recipient government  had answered an IMF 
or World Bank opening bid with its own coherent counter-strategy28. This had 
two important consequences for aid effectiveness. In the first place, the 
donors were so genuinely delighted and charmed to find themselves dealing 
with genuine interlocutors in the policy dialogue29, rather than stooges who 
asked the donors to draft the initial Letter of Development Policy or PRSP30 
and then reneged on the agreement, that they almost immediately gave 
Uganda and Ethiopia long-term and stable commitments to all the aid they 
needed – including debt relief under HIPC. In the second place the 
governments of Uganda and Ethiopia, because they were managing aid flows 
proactively rather than passively, took active steps to avoid the institutional 
moral hazard traps advertised by the aid-sceptical literature – notably the trap 
of using aid as a substitute for the development of indigenous sources of tax 
revenue. Thus whereas there is quite a strong case for arguing that aid has 
been associated with long-term institutional erosion in many African countries 
(Braeutigam and Knack,2004), in Ethiopia and Uganda, at least, this argument 
does not hold. Strong leadership, willing to take on short-term political 
opposition in the interests of making the long-term development strategy work, 
sprang the moral hazard trap. 
 
When we focus on Africa, therefore, we observe substantial variation of 
experience across the continent in respect of the two main independent 
variables of this paper – the pattern of public expenditures, and the stability of 
those expenditures and of aid flows. On enquring what causes these 
variations, we discover underlying socio-political forces, not easy to quantify 
and therefore not covered in the econometric analysis of Section 2, which 
appear to account for some of them – protectional policies, stability of aid 
flows and long-term political commitment.. Where these conditioning factors 
are favourable, we are indeed seeing the beginnings of a green revolution, 
                                                 
27 Note the contrast with the South African homeland model in which farmers were not given any 
incentive to develop linkage investments. 
28 With the arguable exception of Mauritus in the early 1980s. 
29 This particularly applies to the relationship between the World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz 
and the Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi at the end of the 1990s, which quickly developed into one of 
extreme mutual admiration – and in the process opened up a split between the Bank and the IMF. See 
Stiglitz(2003), chapter    . 
30 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – intended by the donors to be drafted by the recipient government 
in active consultation with civil society groups as a basis fro long-term aid flows. For evidence that 
many PRSPs however continue to be drafted in Washington rather than in the desired way see the 
paper by Stewart (2003). 
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and of long-term poverty reduction, on a scale rivalling that achieved in East 
Asia during the 1970s and 80s:the Ugandan achievement in nearly halving 
poverty over an eight-year period has not been observed before in Africa, 
ever, and very seldom in any other developing country. 
 
 
4.Conclusions 
              We are thus able to suggest two additional channels by which the 
poverty impact of aid may be enhanced. On the basis of both global cross-
section and African-case study evidence, it looks as if aid flows may have 
increased ability to reduce poverty if they can be made more stable, and if 
their composition is shifted in a more pro-poor direction, one element in which 
is support for the smallholder agriculture sector. This is not to downplay the 
importance of complementary anti-poverty strategies, in particular the 
development of the off-farm sector31 , labour-market based approaches such 
as public employment schemes and general pro-poor expenditure strategies; 
indeed one of the messages of this paper is that  much of the expenditure 
which benefits agriculture is not expenditure within the agricultural sector. 
 
The lessons for policy-makers follow directly from the three key drivers of aid 
allocation and stability listed on pages xx-xx.  
 
 
In the first place, and emerging especially from the African case-study part of 
the paper, we have observed certain characteristics of institutions and of the 
aid relationship which appear to be conducive to the effectiveness of aid 
against poverty. We have argued that institutions and behaviours which 
protect against risk are as important – on the evidence presented here, more 
important – for growth and poverty reduction at least in an African setting  
than institutions which protect private property rights as argued by the 
Washington Consensus on Agriculture (Binswanger and Townsend 2000, 
Acemoglu et al 2001). Specifically, we argue that it is through the 
development of ‘protectional’ risk-minimising strategies in infrastructure, in 
research, in extension and in budget management, more than through the 
opening-up of the economy, that the Ethiopian and Ugandan governments 
have been able to defend against shocks and sustain their green revolutions 
longer than any predecessor. The sustaining of these strategies, although 
initiated by recipient governments, counts also as an achievement of the ‘new 
conditionality’ which has characterised the majority of donor-recipient 
relationships in recent years. 
 
In the second place, factors which build trust between donor and recipient – 
initiative-taking by the recipient, key policy signals arising in the recipient 
country such as low corruption, and procedural factors such as World 
Bank/IMF resident missions – are associated, other things being equal, with 
                                                 
31 As noted by a referee, there are some indications from the problems which Uganda is experiencing in 
lowering poverty since 2000 that Uganda is encountering diminishing returns to its pro-agriculture 
spending policy, and a switch to an expenditure mix more orientated towards the non-farm sector (as in 
a number of Asian countries since the 1980s) might now be appropriate. 
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relatively high aid stability and thereby with relatively high levels of aid 
effectiveness.   
 
 
Finally, a combination of high expectations aroused by the spread of 
democracy and the donors’ increasing poverty focus has increased the 
attractiveness of  pro-poor policies, we argue, as a political instrument for 
developing-country governments . This insight has for many years been acted 
upon by the governments of low-income Asia, but its implementation by 
African governments is relatively recent. A cluster of such governments, 
including Uganda and Ethiopia, the two used as exemplars in our case 
studies, have however illustrated through the 1990s that it is possible to use  
pro-poor expenditure, with agriculture in a leading role, as a means of winning 
support for a broad-based national development strategy – albeit in Ethiopia 
the political expectations aroused by this process have proved increasingly 
difficult to contain. Driven more than many developing countries by the ever-
present fear of a return to civil conflict, they have perceived that pro-poor 
expenditure, and within that a strategy to prioritise smallholder agriculture, 
was an important instrument in the politics of survival. The dissemination of 
this insight might be one of the more important practical ideas available for 
reducing poverty in Africa. 
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